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rupt, rendering the delayed remedy ineffectual. Thus, whatever happens,
one or the other party must lose a valuable right. This dilemma seems
unavoidable under the holding of the principal case that no surety rela-
tionship arises. In view of this difficulty, and since there is North
Carolina authority flatly contra to the principal case, 16 it is suggested
that North Carolina should reverse its present position on this point




The plaintiff's eight year old girl wandered onto a cement walk
across defendant's bridge and, while dropping rocks from a pile of
crushed stone on the bridge into the water below, fell off and was
drowned. Several small children lived in a mill settlement nearby.
A nonsuit was affirmed on the grounds that infants are as essentially
trespassers as adults and may not recover under the attractive nuisance
doctrine unless the facts are sufficient to impose the duty of anticipation
or prevision.1
But in another case decided the same day the court held that the
defendant should reasonably have anticipated that small children would
be attracted to and injured by his property where the plaintiff's two
infant children were drowned in an unguarded, abandoned cistern or
reservoir around and in which children had been accustomed to play
and fish for a number of years.
2
The doctrine of attractive nuisance is an exception to the general
rule that a landowner is not responsible to a trespasser for a condition
however, that the majority view, according to which the mortgagor is released
from liability to the mortgagee, goes upon the assumption that by granting the
extension of time the mortgagee has put it out of the power of the mortgagor to
have the same remedy over he would have had but for such extension. See
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Bussey, 49 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
' Hamilton v. Benton, 180 N. C. 79, 104 S. E. 78 (1920) (while a chattel
mortgage was involved here, no reason is seen why this should justify a distinc-
tion between this and the principal case. However, the result of this case was also
placed upon another ground.)
'7 This might be effected by a statute somewhat as follows: Whenever any
real or personal property incumbered by a mortgage shall be conveyed subject to
such mortgage, and in such conveyance there shall be a provision that the grantee
shall assume and pay such incumbrance, if the holder of the mortgage thereafter
recognizes the liability of the grantee to him, by accepting 'payments on the mort-
gage debt or otherwise, then, as against such holder of the mortgage, the grantee
shall be considered the principal debtor and the mortgagor or intermediate grantee
who may likewise have assumed the mortgage shall be considered a surety.
'Boyd v. Atlanta S. C. A. L. R. Co., 207 N. C. 390, 177 S. E. 1 (1934).
2 Brannon v. Sprinkle, 207 N. C. 398, 177 S. E. 114 (1934).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the premises. 3 Liability has been based on two theories :4 (1) gen-
eral negligence of the landowner where the attractive instrumentality is
so dangerous as to impose the duty of anticipating some injury from
leaving it unguarded 5 (all the North Carolina cases lie in this group) ;6
and (2) an invitation to enter the premises implied from the allure-
ment.7 Several requirements are necessary to establish liability under
this latter theory: (a) the object must be unusually attractive to chil-
dren of tender years ;8 (b) the thing must be on defendant's own land ;9
8 Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) ; Kramer v. Southern R.
Co., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900); CooT-Y, TORTS (3rd ed. 1906) 1258,
1268.
' Some jurisdictions have refused, however, to recognize the doctrine at all:
Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Beavers, 113 Ga. 398, 39 S. E. 82 (901) ; Kidder v.
Sadler, 117 Me. 194, 103 At. 159 (1918) ; State v. Machen, 164 Md. 579, 165 Atl.
695 (1933); Ryan v. Tower, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (1901); Frost v.
Eastern R. R., 64 N. H. 220, 9 Atl. 790 (1887) ; Hockstein v. Congregation Talmud
Torah Sons etc., 144 Misc. Rep. 207, 258 N. Y. S. 479 (1932); Filer v. McNair,
158 Va. 88, 163 S. E. 335 (1932); Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, (1929) A. C.
358.
Sioux City S. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U. S. 657, 21 L. ed. 745 (1873);
Rataz v. N. Y. Eskimo Pie Corp., 73 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934); Clark v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 118 Cal. App. 344, 5 P. (2d) 58 (1931); Stark v.
Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330 (1925); Peters v. Pierce, 146 La. 902, 84
So. 198 (1920) ; Ann Arbor R. Co. v. King, 68 Ohio St. 210, 67 N. E. 479 (1903) ;
Gilmartin v. City of Philadelphia, 201 Pa. 518, 51 Atl. 312 (1902); Whirley v.
Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610 (1858) ; RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1934) §330 comments to
(a), (b).
'Kramer v. Southern R. Co., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900) ; Briscoe v.
Henderson Lighting & Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600 (1908); Ferrell
v. Dixie Cotton Mills, 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142 (1911); Starling v. Selma
Cotton Mills, 168 N. C. 229, 84 S. E. 388 (1915); Comer v. Winston-Salem, 178
N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919).
"United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66
L. ed. 615 (1922) ; Best v. Dist. of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 54 Sup. Ct. 487,
78 L. ed. 882 (1934) ; Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kilpatrick, 185 Ark. 678,
49 S. W. (2d) 353 (1932); Howard v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155,
(1933) ; Biggs v. Consolidated Barbwire Co., 60 Kan. 217, 56 Pac. 4 (1899).
8 Clark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 114 Cal. App. 344, 5 P. (2d) 58 (1931);
Peters v. Pearce, 146 La. 902, 84 So. 198 (1920) ; Walsh v. Fitchburg R. Co., 145
N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895); Flippen Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207
S. W. 121 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918). The children must be of tender years, but no
age has been determined at which the court can say as a matter of law that the
doctrine is applicable; Central of Ga. R. R. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367
(1923). Various courts have held that the child must be: (a) below the age of
puberty, Central of Ga. R. R. v. Robins, mtpra: (b) below the age of 14, Lips-
comb v. Cincinnati, N. & C. St. R. Co., 238 Ky. 572, 39 S. W. (2d) 465 (1931) ;
(c) of such a tender age as not to appreciate -the danger of her acts, Loftus v.
Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901); or that it is a question for the jury
to decide whether the doctrine applies to the individual child; Biggs v. Con-
solidated Barbwire Co., 60 Kan. 217, 56 Pac. 4 (1899).
'Kramer v. Southern R. Co., 127 N. C. 328, 37 S. E. 468 (1900) ; RESTATEmENT,
TORTS (1934) §339. The attractive nuisance doctrine was developed essentially
to protect children trespassing on the property of another, but the doctrine has,
in some cases, been extended to cover any object which might reasonably be
expected to lure infants to their injury. See Rataz v. N. Y. Eskimo Pie Corp.,
73 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 3rd., 1934) (playing with dry ice) ; Kansas City, Ft.,
S. & M. R. Co. v. Matson, 68 Kan. 815, 75 Pac. 503 (1904) ; Harper v. Kapp, 24
Ky. Law Rep. 2342, 73 S. W. 1127 (1903); Ramsey v. Nat. Contracting Co., 49
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(c) the children must be lured onto the land by the dangerous instru-
mentality itself ;1o (d) the danger must be latent;" (e) it must be prac-
tical to guard the thing without great expense or inconvenience to the
owner; 12 (f) the condition must be artificial in some jurisdictions, and a
few have refused to apply the doctrine to any body of water, whether
artificial or not.13
It seems obvious that the idea of implied invitation is based on a
fiction, both of law and of fact, and a fiction which cannot be given its
full logical extension. 14 The rule announced by the North Carolina
court in the instant cases is sound. If liability of the owner is based
on common law principles of negligence, that is, reasonable foresee-
ability, all the characteristics of the attractive nuisance doctrine are
retained 15 with a flexibility which makes it possible to shape the rule to
fit the facts of each case, a necessity in the field of torts.16 That may well
be illustrated by the results of the principal cases. In one there was an
unguarded reservoir, in the other an unguarded cement walk over a
river; in both the owner knew or had reason to know that children
would be attracted to his premises, and might reasonably have been
expected to anticipate the accident. It is difficult to distinguish the
App. Div. 11, 63 N. Y. S. 286 (1900); Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190
N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925).
"o United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299, 66
L. ed. 615 (1922); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz.
491, 8 P. (2d) 249 (1932); Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 52 Utah 598, 221
Pac. 568 (1923). But see Arkansas Power & Light Co., 185 Ark. 678, 49 S. W.
(2d) 353 (1932) (a dangerous situation in close proximity to an attractive situa-
tion must :be considered together as forming a dangerous and attractive whole).
'Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) ; Clark v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 118 Cal. App. 344, 5 P. (2d) 58 (1931) ; McCall v. McCallie, 48
Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1933); Erickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 82
Minn. 60, 84 N. W. 462 (1900). In Coleman v. Robert Graves Co., 39 Misc.
Rep. 85, 78 N. Y. S. 893 (1902), it was held that the object must be virtually a
trap, but ordinarily it seems to be sufficient if the danger is not common and
well-known. However, the owner is not bound to anticipate danger from the
unusual or improper use of an object safe in itself; Gilmartin v. City of Phila-
delphia, 201 Pa. 518, 51 At. 312 (1902).
" See infra note 18.
'McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1916); Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. O'Neal, 178 S. E. 451 (Ga. 1934) ; Gurley v. Southern Power Co.,
172 N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916), but in this case the court apparently was in-
fluenced by the fact that the defendant's agent, secretly and against his instruc-
tions, operated a tank on the property as a swimming pool; Fiel v. City of Racine,
203 Wis. 149, 233 N. W. 611 (1930); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §339.
"Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine (1922) 1 N. C.
L. REv. 162.
1 It has repeatedly been held that adults are bound to anticipate "childish
instincts". Howard v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155 (1933); Powers v.
Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. W. 257 (1884); Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry,
190 N. C. 649, 130 S. E. 638 (1925); Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610
(1858); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §290.
" Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine (1922) 1. N. C.
L. REv. 162.
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cases on the facts, yet the court reaches opposite results in each and
both are amply supported by authority.1" However, the cases may be
reconciled by a theory which does not appear in the opinions. In the
Brannon case, the reservoir was useless and abandoned, and could easily
have been made safe for children. In the Boyd case, the property in
question served a very useful purpose which might have been wholly
or partly destroyed had the decision of the court been any different, since
children could hardly be kept off the bridge without a complete barri-
cade of it. At any rate, the safe-guarding of the premises would have
been attended with great expense and inconvenience to the owner, and
every railroad bridge in North Carolina which is near a small settle-
ment would necessarily have to be altered. Thus the court appears to
have invoked public policy in balancing the utility of the object with
the danger to trespassing children.1 8 It is submitted that the two prin-
cipal cases, though aparently conflicting, are correctly decided.
MAURICE V. BARNHILL, JR.
Nonsuit-Waivevr of Motion by Cross-Examination
of Codefendant.
In a damage suit against the driver of an automobile and the
driver's employer, both defendants moved for nonsuit at the close of
the plaintiff's evidence and entered exceptions to the order overruling
their motions. The driver then introduced evidence including his own
testimony. The employer cross-examined the driver and witnesses
introduced by him, but offered no evidence himself. Plaintiff offered
17 Liability was established under substantially the same circumstances in the
following: Price v. Atchison Water Co., 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450 (1897) ; Howard
v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155 (1933); Comer y. Winston-Salem, 178
N. C. 383, 100 S. E. 619 (1919) ; cf. Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo. 513, 273
S. W. 401 (1925). Recovery was denied in the following: McCall v. McCallie,
48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1933); Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172 N.
C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916). Btit see comment in note 13, supra; Fiel v. City of
Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 233 N. W. 611 (1930).
"This was originally a primary consideration. In the Stout case, infra, it was
said that the turntable might have been made safe by the addition of a simple
and inexpensive lock. The omission of such simple safe-guards is negligent in
comparison with the unreasonable risk to children, 'but where such further safe-
guards are required as to interfere with the utility of the condition maintained
by defendant, then it cannot be said that the defendant is negligent in not render-
ing the condition safe. See Sioux City S. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U. S. 657,
21 L. ed. 745 (1873); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896);
Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901) ; Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33
Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570 (1908) ; RESrATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) §339 Comment (d)
(A landownir is liable for injuries to children trespassing on his land caused by a
structure or other artificial condition thereon, if "the utility to the possessor of
maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children
involved therein") ; Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the Degree of the Difficulty
of Removal of the Danger as Factors in "Attractive Nuisaiwe" Cases (1934) 18
MINx. L. RPv. 523.
